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STUDENT NOTE
CONSTRUCTION WORKERS IN INTERSTATE TRANSPORTION.-Under
the aegis of the Federal Constitution's commerce clause,' the
United States Congress has enacted several statutes regulating dif-
ferent phases of labor-management relations in the business of
interstate transportation. The construction worker's place in
these regulations has been one of exclusion as often as not; but
.such exclusion has obtained through a tortuous process of inter-
pretation by the courts. The importance of this determination is
vital to such workers, since the common law rights generally are
far different from the statutory rights. A short review of several
of the more important federal statutes as they apply to construction
workers will serve as a guide to the litigant, as a view of the evolv-
ing liberality of judicial interpretation as well as Congressional
concepts, and as a hint of decisions (and, possibly, amendatory
statutes) to come. These statutes, from the construction worker's
position, are of two types: in the first species, which includes as
examples the Railway Labor Act2 and the Labor-Management Re-
1U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have the Power .... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes..."
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lations Act, 1947,3 the occupation of the employer decides the is-
sue; in the second, which embraces the Employers' Liability Act4
and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,5 the work of the em-
ployee furnishes the key.
The Railway Labor Act, designed to prevent transportation
breakdowns due to labor-management imbroglios, applies gen-
erally to all employees of any carrier "subject to chapter 1 of Title
49 (Interstate Commerce Act), and any company which is directly or
indirectly controlled by or under common control with any carrier
by railroad and which operates any equipment or facilities or per-
forms any service (other than trucking service) in connection with
(services ancillary to transportation) by railroad."'  The Labor-
Management Relations Act, 1947, alias the Taft-Hartley Act, ap-
plies to all employers and employees of an "industry affecting
commerce," i. e., by Congressional definition, "any industry or
activity in commerce, or in which a labor dispute would burden
or obstruct commerce or tend to burden or obstruct commerce or
the free flow of commerce," excepting generally federal or state
government employees "or any person subject to the Railway Labor
Act, as amended from time to time.' ' 7 The National Labor Rela-
tions Act, predecessor of the Labor-Management Relations Act,
was equally broad in scope;8 the successor to the present stature (at
this writing only imminent) will undoubtedly be just as comprehen-
sive. The point, however, is that such statutes as these affect con-
struction workers only as they affect all other employees of a par-
ticudar employer: unless that employer is covered by the statute,
no employee is within its terms.
But this employee classlessness is not characteristic of statutes
of the second class. The original provisions of the Employers'
Liability Act made "every common carrier by railroad while engag-
ing in (interstate or foreign) commerce" liable generally for injury
254 STAT. 785 (1940), 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-188 (1946).
361 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. §§ 141-197 (Supp. 1948).
453 SAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60 (1946).
552STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §§ 201-219 (1946).
4-1 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U. S. C. § 151 (1946).
7 61 STAT. 363 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 142 (Supp. 1948).
sSee the section of definitions, 49 STAT. 450 (1935).
9Lack of space prevents any discussion of the exact industries covered by
these two acts. Other examples, where all employees of a certain employer
class are covered, are the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 56 STAT. 209 (1942),
as amended 60 STAT. 722, 45 U. S. C. §§ 228a-228s (1946), and the Hours of
Service Act, 34 STAT. 1415 (1907), 45 U. S. C. §§ 61-66 (1946).
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or death of any employee, "while he is employed by such carrier in
such commerce," resulting from the negligence of any railroad
agent or from a mechanical defect or insufficiency in any railroad
equipment.1 0 Whether a railroad company was "engaging in com-
merce," the Supreme Court decided, depended upon the nature of
the work that the injured employee was performing at the time
of his injury: "Was the employee at the time of his injury engaged
in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to
be practically a part of it?"" This remained the test for the in-
clusion of a railroad worker within the Act; 12 the application of
that test to construction workers, however, was not easy. Where
the construction was an extension into new areas of service - with
the company in question preparing to serve instead of improving
existing services - the accepted rule was that such employees were
not engaged in commerce within the Act. An excavation worker
on a bridge as part of a new line, for example, had no standing;":
an inspector for an extended track site, when the right of way had
not even been secured, was not protected.'4  On the other hand,
a worker performing routine maintenance work, including normal
repairs, was so closely related to transportation as to be part of it."
From such extremes came the theory that, while repair and main-
tenance workers were within the Act, construction workers were
not.
Unfortunately, not all work on transportation facilities fitted
easily into classifications of either repair and maintenance or con-
struction. As long as the construction was to replace existing fix-
tures, the universal rule was that such replacement workers were
not within the protection of the Act.' 6 Workers on construction
10 35 STAT. 65 (1908).
11 See Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 239 U. S. 556, 558, L. R. A. 1916C
797 (1916).
12See, e. g., Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Bolle, 284 U. S. 74 (1931).
13 Baxter v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 139 Kan. 443, 32 P. 2d 451 (1934).
14 Southern Pac. Co. v. Middleton, 54 F. 2d 833 (C. C. A. 5th 1932).
115 Pederson v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 229 U. S. 146, Ann. Cas. 1914C 153
(]913). This repair doctrine covers routine and continual replacement of
minor items of equipment, such as company telephone and telegraph poles as
they rot out. Coal & Coke Ry. v. Deal, 231 Fed. 605 (C. C. A. 4th 1916),
writ of error dismissed, 245 U. S. 681 (1917).
16 This does not include the continual routine replacement mentioned in
note 15, supra; obviously, questions of degree are raised.
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of a new station'17 or a new warehouse'18 to replace outmoded struc-
tures, builders of new track layouts 9 and retaining walls 20 in the
elimination of grade crossings, helpers on construction of cut-offs
2 1
and tunnelsa in route-shortening operations, crewmen building
new railroad bridges at or near the old sites,ss and relocators of
company telephone and telegraph lines in changes necessitated by
trackage shifts' 4 were not within the Act. Where the construction
was an improvement of existing works, courts at first refused the
flat distinction between construction and maintenance, most argu-
ing that such improvement was maintenance of adequate service.
These earlier liberals held that the Act applied when the employee
was building abutments for a temporary bridge after destruction
by a flash flood, with the abutments to serve for a later permanent
bridge already on the company program, 2 5 building an addition to
a freight shed,26 installing an automatic electric block signal system
by connection with existing tracks, 27 or attaching new cross-bars on
company telephone and telegraph poles for additional wires.2  But
later decisions forbade benefits under the Act when the worker was
building a new stairway in a station, 9 laying track parallel to the
17 New York Cent. R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, Ann. Cas. 1917D 629,
L. R. A. 1917D 1 (1917).
2s Matti v. Chicago, M. & St. P..Ry., 55 Mont. 280, 176 Pac. 154 (1918).
19 Dickinson v. Industrial Board, 280 Ill. 342, 117 N. E. 438 (1917).
20 Walz v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 232 Ill. App. 398 (1924).
21 Bravis v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 217 Fed. 234 (C. C. A. 8th 1914).
22 Raymond v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 243 U. S. 43 (1917); Jackson v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 210 Fed. 495 (W. D. Wash. 1914).
23Baltimore & 0. C. T. R. R v. Industrial Commission, 336 Ill. 223, 8 N.
E. 2d 642 (1937); McKee v. Ohio Valley E. Ry., 78 W. Va. 131, 88 S. E. 616
(1916). But where a bridge construction worker who was bulldozing earth into
place had the added duty of keeping the approach to the old bridge clear of
earth and rocks, he was allowed recovery under the Act because of his main-
tenance duties with respect to the old tracks. Kinzell v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry., 250 U. S. 130 (1919).
' 4Los Angeles & S. L. R. R. v. Industrial Commission, 2 Cal. 2d 685, 43
P. 2d 282 (1935); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Lundquist, 206 Iowa 499, 221 N. W.
228 (1928), cert. denied, 278 U. S. 658 (1929).
"5Columbia &- P. S. R. R. v. Sauter, 223 Fed. 604 (C. C. A. 9th 1915). This
case is probably distinguishable from the rest because of the repair involved,
but the court's discussion treats the repair and planned rebuilding as a single
unit of work rather than as two separate operations.
"d Eng v. Southern Pac. Co., 210 Fed. 92 (D. Ore. 1913); see Thompson v.
Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 165 Ky. 256, 261, 176 S. W. 1006, 1008 (1915).
'7 Saxton v. El Paso & S. W. R. R., 21 Ariz. 323, 188 Pac. 257 (1920).
28 Ross v. Sheldon, 176 Iowa 618, 154 N. W. 499 (1915).
-9 Clemence v. Hudson & M. R. R., 8 F. 2d 317 (S. D. N. Y. 1925).
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prior single track,30 enlarging a motor platform to permit in-
stallation of a larger motor in a train-watering unit,8 1 enlarging a
turntable,32 or building another cross-over between two switch-
yard tracks.33 By the mid-twenties, at least, all building operations
that could be classified as an improvement of the company's status
quo were, by a settled rule, not engagements in commerce under
the Employers' Liability Act.
In 1939, Congress added a paragraph to the first section of the
Act: "Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such
employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign com-
merce; or shall, in any way directly or closely or substantially, af-
fect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this
chapter, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such
commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this
chapter."' 4 So far, only two cases concerning construction workers
have construed this new paragraph, 5 both of them state court de-
cisions. The Arkansas court, believing that the addition was a
considerable extension of the Act's coverage, held that a worker
building a new track parallel to an existing track and intended
eventually to replace the latter was within the Act by reason of the
amendment; 36 the Idaho court dismissed the paragraph with two
sentences, and, citing pre-1939 decisions, held that the Act did not
protect a worker on a trackage extension project in a company
switching yard.' 7 A reading of the new paragraph in the light of
the history of the original section would seemingly indicate that
the Arkansas decision is closer to the intent of Congress.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which established mini-
mum wages and maximum hours for the employees within its
scope, covered a far greater number of industries than the Employ-
ers' Liability Act. The Act benefits all employees who are "en-
30 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Morgan's Adm'r, 225 Ky. 447, 9 S. W. 2d 212
(1928).
' Boyer v. Pennsylvania R. R., 162 Md. 328, 159 AtI. 909 (1932).
3 Seaver v. Director General, 234 N. Y. 590, 138 N. E. 458 (1922), cert.
denied, 261 U. S. 620 (1932).
33 Connors v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 259 N. Y. Supp. 496 (3d Dep't 1932).
34 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1946).
" A third case, Gulf M. & N. R. R. v. Madden, 190 Miss. 374, 200 So. 119
(1941), completely overlooked the addition to the section in denying statutory
recovery to a worker on a grade crossing elimination crew.
38 Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Fisher, 206 Ark. 705, 177 S. W. 2d 725 (1944).
37 Moser v. Union Pac. R. R., 65 Idaho 479, 147 P. 2d 336 (1944).
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gaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce."38s
Workers constructing transportation facilities fall, if at all, into
the category of workers "engaged in commerce," with the Con-
gressional definition of commerce being "trade, commerce, trans-
portation, transmission, or communication among the several
States or from any State to any place outside thereof." 39 Almost at
once, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the apothegm devised
for the Employers' Liability Act;- perhaps influenced by its
Parlier decision that the occupation of the employer was irrelevant,
and that only the character of the employee's work was material in
deciding whether such worker was employed in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, 41 the Court stated, "The test
.* . is not whether the employee's activities affect or indirectly
relate to interstate commerce but whether they are actually in or
so closely related to the movement of the commerce as to be a part
of it.
'42
With the abandonment of the exact wordage of the original
Employers' Liability Act test, the lower courts have adopted a more
liberal policy toward construction workers in respect to the Fair
Labor Standards Act than they had been allowed in the railroaders'
statute. As long as the construction is clearly new work in an un-
developed area, the accepted view is that workers thereon are not
engaged in commerce. Thus, where the work is construction of a
new airport,43 or a new highway,44 or a new harbor .... that must
38 This is the phrase used in the sections setting the minimum wages, 52
STAT. 1062 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 206 (1946), and maximum hours, 52 STAT. 1063
(1938), as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 207 (1946).
39 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203 (1946).
40 See notes 11 and 12, supra.
41 Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942).
42 See McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491, 497 (1943).
43 Maitrejean v. Metcalfe Construction Co., 165 F. 2d 571 (C. C. A. 8th
1948) (by implication); Laudadio v. White Construction Co., 163 F. 2d 383 (C. C.
A. 2d 1947); Soderberg v. S. Birch & Sons Construction Co., 163 F. 2d 37 (C. C.
A. 9th 1947), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 816 (1947). Contra: Curtis v. McWilliams
Dredging Co., 78 N. Y. S. 2d 317 (N. Y. City Ct. 1948); O'Riordan v. Nick F.
Helmers, Inc., 73 N. Y. S. 2d 428 (N. Y. City Ct. 1947). These New York cases
are the only ones to dispute the theory in respect to original construction in a
new field of operations. All of the cases cited in this footnote share an
unusual distinction in that, although they involved military airports constructed
for the Government, no decision explains that military transportation suffices
as well as commercial transportation to render the facilities "in commerce".
Cf. Murphy v. Reed, 69 Sup. Ct. 105 (1948), reversing 168 F. 2d 257 (C. C. A.
5th 1948); Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 1031 (1948).
44 Crabb v. Welden Bros., 164 F. 2d 797 (C. C. A. 8th 1947) (Alcan High-
way); Preston v. Louis Des Cognets & Co:, 292 Ky. 646, 167 S. W. 2d 863 (1943);
Hewlett v. Del Balso Construction Co., 43 N. Y. S. 2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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be dredged out of a former swamp and thus actually created by
man,4 the Act is not operative. But reconstruction or replace-
ment work, and construction that is fairly an improvement of exist-
ing facilities, is definitely engaging in commerce from the contem.
porary courts' standpoint. Workers on reconstruction of highways"
and bridges,47 on relocation of a highway, 8 and on construction of
a new bridge to replace another one 200 feet downstream 49 have
been allowed recovery under the Act. An unusual line of cases has
evolved the notion that navigable streams and harbors are in the
same class as man-made arteries of commerce, so that improvements
such as the building of dikes, levees and revetments," the construc-
tion of piers,51 and the deepening of channels52 place the laborers
thereon within the Act. The cases as a whole demonstrate a ten-
dency to extend the benefits of federal legislation ever further, in
keeping with the general expansion of federal power under the
commerce clause.
H. L. S. tII
4 5 Nieves v. Standard Dredging Corp., 152 F. 2d 719 (C. C. A. 1st 1945).
46 Walling v. McCrady Construction Co., 165 F. 2d 932 (C. C. A. 3rd 1946),
aff'g 60 F. Supp. 243 (W. D. Pa. 1945); Walling v. Craig, 53 F. Supp. 479 (D.
Minn. 1943) (by implication).
47 Fitzgerald Construction Co. v. Pedersen, 324 U. S. 720 (1945).4 SWalling v. McCrady Construction Co., 156 F. 2d 932 (C. C. A. 3d 1946),
aff'g 60 F. Supp. 243 (W. D. Pa. 1945).
49 Bennett v. V. P. Loftis Co., 167 F. 2d 286 (C. C. A. 4th 1948).
50 Walling v. Patton-Tulley Transp. Co., 134 F. 2d 945 (C. C. A. 6th 1943).
rl Ritch v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 156 F. 2d 334 (C. C. A.
9th 1946). Cf. Brue v. J. Rich Steers, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 668 (S. D. N. Y. 1945),
where a new dry dock in conjunction with a harbor was deemed to be a separate
entity from the harbor, thus making the workers thereon engaged in original
construction, and not within the Act.
52 Ritch v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 156 F. 2d 334 (C. C. A.
9th 1946). Cf. Brue v. J. Rich Steers, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 668 (S. D. N. Y. 1945),
1946).
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